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Abstract 
We use search volume index (SVI) for a CEO’s name and stock ticker from Google Trends to 
measure CEO publicity, and examine the competing hypotheses on its relation to tax 
avoidance. On the one hand, CEOs who receive more attention from retail investors may 
engage in tax evasion activities to meet investors’ performance expectations; on the other 
hand, they are more concerned with public image and avoiding being labeled as tax avoiders. 
Based on the CEOs of S&P 500 firms between 2004 and 2011, our finding supports the 
former and shows that CEOs with higher publicity manage to have a lower effective tax rate 
and cash effective tax rate. Such effect is moderated by board independence. Finally, firms 
with higher CEO publicity pay auditors higher tax fees, suggesting that these CEOs tend to 
use more tax planning services from auditors.  
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1. Introduction 
Managers have a significant impact on their corporate tax avoidance that cannot be 
explained by firm-level characteristics (Dyreng et al., 2010). They study leaves on the  what 
specific characteristics of managers affect corporate tax avoidance? Following the seminal 
work of Dyreng et al. (2010), Olsen and Stekelberg (2016) show that narcissistic CEOs are 
more likely to engage in tax avoidance because they have high self-entitlement, are 
exploitative, and lack moral sensibility. Law and Mills (2017) find that CEOs with military 
experience are less likely to engage in tax avoidance because they share the common value 
with government legitimacy and are more ethical. This paper studies CEO publicity as a new 
dimension of CEO characteristics, and examines its effects on firms’ tax avoidance behavior. 
Publicity refers to the attention given to CEOs by retail investors.  
 We suggest that CEOs can influence corporate strategy, including tax policy, by 
setting the tone at the top and influencing the corporate culture. Corporate culture is a 
collective phenomenon emerging from the members’ beliefs and social interaction, 
containing shared values, mutual understanding, and behavioral expectations that tie 
individuals in an organization together over time (Schein, 2004). Upper echelon leaders have 
primary attributes of organizational culture (Schein, 2004; Trice and Beyer, 1993). If some 
CEOs are inclined to aggressively avoid tax, they would recruit executives with similar 
values and beliefs to join the top management team (TMT). As a team, they are able to 
structure transactions to re-allocate taxable income from a high tax rate regime to a low tax 
rate regime, employ transfer pricing initiatives, set up offshore intellectual property havens, 
and centralize operating activities in tax-friendly jurisdictions to minimize overall corporate 
tax or assert the intention to permanently re-invest foreign earnings and not accrue 
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incremental US tax expense upon repatriation (Dharmapala and Hines, 2009; Dharmapala 
and Riedel, 2013; Powers et al., 2016).  
We hypothesize opposing effects of CEO publicity on tax avoidance. On the one 
hand, CEOs with higher public attention care more about investors’ expectations and 
therefore use aggressive tax planning strategies to increase earnings. Malmendier and Tate 
(2009) show that investors’ expectations of future firm performance are higher for superstar 
CEOs. Because failing to meet investors’ expectations could be detrimental to CEOs’ public 
image and future career, CEOs with higher publicity may use tax avoidance to increase 
earnings to meet or beat performance expectations. CEO publicity is therefore positively 
associated with firms’ tax avoidance behavior. 
On the other hand, tax avoidance can be costly to CEOs. For example, tax avoidance 
can result in a higher probability of a tax audit, leading to an assessment of additional 
taxes, fines, interest, and penalties by tax authorities (Mills et al., 1998). A survey 
conducted by Graham et al. (2014) shows that almost half of respondents agree that an 
unfavorable consequence of aggressive tax avoidance is the potential harm to a firm’s 
reputation. When tax avoidance activities are identified and penalized by the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS), CEO publicity exaggerates the loss in terms of credibility and 
future career opportunities. These CEOs may suffer from a decline in social status and 
esteem. This suggests that CEO publicity can be negatively associated with tax avoidance 
behavior. The net effect of CEO publicity presents a timely and important research 
question.  
Our sample includes CEOs of S&P 500 firms between 2004 and 2011. We use the 
search volume index (SVI) for each CEO’s full name, plus the stock ticker of the company 
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provided by Google Trends as a proxy for CEO publicity.2 Google is arguably the most 
convenient tool for individual investors to search for information about CEOs on the 
internet. Ding and Hou (2015) argue that SVI captures the active attention of retail 
investors. CEOs with larger SVI(s) therefore receive more publicity. Different from the 
indicator of superstar CEOs (Malmendier and Tate, 2009), which is observed for a very 
small proportion of CEOs, our publicity proxy provides a continuous measure for many 
CEOs. In addition, the traditional measures of CEO reputation can only explain about 11% 
of the variation in CEO publicity, showing that CEO publicity captures a new dimension of 
CEO characteristics.  
We find that CEO publicity is associated with a higher level of tax avoidance 
activities, as indicated by the lower effective tax rate and cash effective tax rate. The effect 
is both statistically and economically significant. A one standard deviation increase from 
the mean of publicity measure leads to a 3.8% decrease in effective tax rate. The positive 
effect of CEO publicity on firms’ tax avoidance activities is more pronounced among firms 
with less independent boards, implying the effective role of outside directors in moderating 
the aggressive tax avoidance by CEOs with high publicity. Finally, CEO publicity is 
positively associated with the level of tax fees paid to external auditors, showing that CEOs 
with high publicity use more services related to tax planning from auditing firms.  
There are a number of alternative interpretations that are compatible with our results. 
For example, there might be confounding effects of other CEO characteristics or industry 
attributes. We find that the results are robust to the inclusion of CEO media coverage, age, 
gender, outside CEO, earnings management, year and industry fixed effects, as well as the 
                                                 
2 Consistent with previous studies that count press articles as a measure of CEOs’ status (Milbourn, 2003), we 
require a concurrent search for the stock ticker of the firm to avoid over-stated searches for common names such 
as John Smith. 
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propensity score matching (PSM) approach. To address the concern of reverse causality, 
we apply the dynamic panel GMM estimator and find the results consistent. 
Our contribution to the literature is three-fold. First, this study complements the 
growing literature on the effects of CEO characteristics on firm outcomes, and tax 
avoidance in particular. Since Bertrand and Schoar (2003) and Dyreng et al. (2010), an 
increasing number of studies identify the managerial effects of CEO characteristics, 
including superstar status (Malmendier and Tate, 2009), reputation (Francis et al., 2008), 
ability (Baik et al., 2011; Demerjian et al., 2012.), facial masculinity (Kamiya et al., 2016), 
signature size (Ham et al., 2017), and overseas experience (Duan and Hou, 2017). Law and 
Mill (2017) find that CEOs with military experience pursue less tax avoidance. We use 
SVI to measure CEO publicity, a new dimension of CEO characteristics, and provide 
original evidence on its positive impact on tax avoidance.  
Second, this paper adds to the literature on tax avoidance and the “under-sheltering 
puzzle” (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010; Gallemore et al., 2013; Dowling, 2014) by identifying 
a new source of variation in firms’ engagement in tax avoidance. While prior literature 
examines influential factors, including incentives for managers (Desai and Dharmapala, 
2006), family ownership (Chen et al., 2010), labor union (Chyz et al., 2013), and board ties to 
low-tax firms (Brown and Drake, 2014), this study focuses on CEO publicity and finds it 
helpful in explaining the variation in the effective tax rate of US public firms.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 proposes the competing 
hypotheses. Section 3 introduces the setting and research design. Sections 4 and 5 report 
the empirical results and robustness checks. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Competing Hypotheses  
The high publicity of CEOs may increase the market’s expectations.  These CEOs 
therefore would be under greater pressure to increase reported earnings. Brown and Caylor 
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(2003) show that managers’ focus has shifted from avoiding losses or earnings decrease to 
meeting or beating analysts’ expectations since the 1990s. Firms receive more positive 
valuation for meeting or beating analysts’ expectations. When they find it difficult to meet 
investors’ expectations, they may choose to use aggressive tax planning strategies to reduce 
the overall tax expense for their firm. For example, Graham et al. (2014) find that 61% of 
executives in their surveyed companies indicate that it is important that tax strategies do not 
reduce earnings per share (EPS), and 49% respond that it is important that tax strategies lead 
to high EPS. Furthermore, every dollar saved from reduced tax can be redeployed to more 
productive uses. For a firm that faces financial constraints in funding its profitable investment 
opportunities, the cash savings from tax expenses can be utilized to finance these 
investments, which would otherwise never be achieved (Edwards et al., 2012). Based on this 
discussion, we propose H1 as follows: 
H1a: CEO publicity is positively associated with firms’ tax avoidance behavior. 
There are also reasons for CEOs with high publicity not to engage in tax avoidance. 
When a company’s aggressive tax avoidance behavior is identified by the tax authority and 
reported by the media, reputation costs are imposed on the company and CEO. In a survey of 
tax executives, Graham et al. (2014) find that almost half agree that potential harm to their 
firm’s reputation is a very important factor in deciding whether to implement an (aggressive) 
tax planning strategy. Moreover, the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
contends that the general public has little tolerance for overly aggressive tax planning, and 
aggressive tax strategies lead to the loss of customer loyalty and damaged corporate image. 
For example, an article published in the New York Times on March 24th, 2011, responded to 
the fact that General Electricity (GE) paid virtually no tax to the US government in 2011 by 
noting, “critics say assertive tax avoidance of multinationals (such as GE) not only short 
changes the Treasury but also harms the economy by discouraging investment and 
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employment in the US” (Kocieniewski, 2011). Furthermore, commentators reacted by 
advocating, “this company (GE) should be boycotted.” Aggressive tax avoidance is also 
likely to negatively affect the future careers of CEOs of companies undertaking such 
behavior. Therefore, managers have to trade off these costs against the expected benefits 
associated with tax avoidance. The publicity of CEOs can exaggerate the potential reputation 
cost if their tax avoidance activities are detected. If CEOs believe that the marginal cost of 
tax avoidance (i.e., adverse career perspective) exceeds the marginal benefit (i.e., increased 
earnings), they are induced to reduce the extent to which their firms engage in tax avoidance 
behavior. We hereby propose the competing hypothesis as follows:  
H1b: CEO publicity is negatively associated with firms’ tax avoidance behavior. 
3. Setting and research design 
3.1 Data and Sample 
To study CEO publicity, we focus on CEOs of S&P 500 companies identified from the 
Execucomp database between 2004 and 2011. The sample period starts in 2004, when Google 
started to make SVI publicly accessible. We examine the sample of CEOs of S&P 500 
companies because SVI (search volume index) is often not available for CEOs at small firms, 
whose search volume is too low to be recorded by Google Trends.  
 Execucomp provides information on the top five executives and information on CEOs 
(i.e. “Date Became CEO” and “Date Left as CEO”). We identify the CEOs from S&P 500 
firms, and follow Milbourn (2003) to address the case of midyear CEO turnover. We only 
treat executives as CEOs in the year of CEO turnover if they were in office at least six 
months, and we obtain 3,862 observations. For CEOs who left the position before the year 
end, we only identify these as CEOs for the year if they held the position for at least six 
months. Likewise, for newly appointed CEOs, we identify these as CEOs only when they 
held the position for at least six months of the year. We also drop the following cases: 1) 
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executives whose title is “co-CEO”; 2) both the departing and incoming CEO worked for six 
months in the same calendar year; 3) executives whose “date Joined Company” is after “date 
Became CEO.” 
Next, we collect weekly SVI (search volume index) data for CEOs from Google Trends 
(www.google.com/trends). The SVI data represent the relative searching volume to the 
highest point of searching volume in the searching geography and time period. The highest 
point is 100, which represents the highest searching volume in the geography and time 
period, and other points represent the searching volume relative to the highest point. SVI has 
been widely used to proxy attention actively paid by retail investors (Da et al., 2011; Ding 
and Hou, 2015). We use SVI that originates from the US because the majority of S&P 500 
companies are US firms. We use the ‘full name’ of the CEO provided by Execucomp and the 
‘ticker’ of the company to search for and obtain the weekly SVI for the specified CEO. We 
note that the SVI data are on a monthly basis for terms that are rarely searched for. We drop 
these observations to make the data comparable. This leaves us with 3,430 observations. 
For example, in 2008 the CEO of Apple Computer Inc. was Steve P. Jobs, and the ticker 
for Apple was “AAPL”, so we use ‘Steve P. Jobs+AAPL’ to search for the SVI for Steven 
Jobs in 2008. We later convert the weekly SVI data into annual data to match the frequency 
of tax avoidance. In addition, we manually collect the number of the online news for the CEO 
from Google News in each calendar year by searching “CEO’s full name+stock ticker.” Our 
sample consists of 2,841 observations for S&P 500 companies between 2004 and 2011. 
Finally, we collect accounting data from Compustat and stock market data from CRSP. 
3.2 Research design 
We use the following model to test the hypotheses: 
                TaxAvoidancet =a0 +a1CEOSVIt + ai+1
i=1
n
å Controli,t +Year+ Industry+e  
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Following prior literature (Dyreng et al., 2010; Armstrong et al., 2012), we use 
effective tax rate (ETR) and cash effective tax rate (cash ETR) as proxies for firms’ tax 
avoidance. Unlike effective tax rate, cash effective tax rate is not biased by changes in tax 
accounting accruals. Additionally, cash effective tax rate reflects any tax avoidance activities 
that reduce cash taxes paid in the current period, including those that defer cash tax paid by 
creating temporary book-tax difference (Dyreng et al., 2008). Following the literature, 
effective tax rate is defined as total tax expense scaled by pre-tax accounting income, while 
cash effective tax rate (cash ETR) is defined as cash tax expense scaled by pre-tax income 
(Dyreng et al., 2010). Lower ETR (cash ETR) implies more tax avoidance. 
The variable of interest is CEOSVI, which is measured by SVIMean and SVIMedian. 
SVIMean is the average weekly SVI for a CEO in calendar year t scaled by 100. SVIMedian 
is the median of all the weekly SVI for a CEO in calendar year t scaled by 100. We also 
control for CEONews in the regression, a measure of the passive attention from the public, 
defined as the number of online news for a CEO in calendar year t from Google News. Chen 
et al. (2015) show that media coverage plays an important role in tax avoidance behavior by 
serving as an information intermediary that provides new information and disseminates 
existing information. Media exposure of a CEO may influence corporate tax avoidance. To 
consider the confounding effects of media coverage, we control for CEONews. We apply 
year- and industry-fixed effects in the analysis.  
Industry traits may have an unobservable confounding effect on the relationship 
between CEO publicity and corporate tax avoidance. For example, CEOs in high-tech 
internet companies, such as Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook or Larry Page of Google, are more 
likely to draw more public attention. Meanwhile, tax avoidance behaviors might be more 
common in certain industries. We therefore control the industry- and year-fixed effects in our 
regression to control the confounding effect of unobservable industry or time factors.  
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We control for variables that are identified in the literature as affecting firms’ tax 
avoidance activities. All control variables are defined in the appendix. We incorporate firm 
characteristics, such as firm size (SIZE), the percentage of income that is generated from 
foreign operations (FI), leverage (LEV), and research and development activities (R&D). 
Large firms enjoy economies of scale in tax planning. Firms with substantial foreign 
operations have the advantage of shifting income between low and high tax rate jurisdictions 
(Rego, 2003). Firms with great leverage have less incentive to engage in tax avoidance due to 
the tax shield of debt. We also control for firm performance characteristics, such as firm 
profitability (ROA), net operating loss carry forwards (NOL and DNOL), income related to 
the equity method of accounting (EQINC), and a firm’s growth opportunities (MTB). Firms 
with negative pre-tax income or significant net operating carry forward are likely to have less 
incentive to avoid taxes. EQINC controls for differences in financial and tax accounting 
treatment that influence effective tax rate and cash effective tax rate (Frank et al., 2009). 
Rapidly growing firms are found to invest more in tax planning activities (Chen et al., 2010). 
We include intangible assets over lagged assets (INTAN) and property, plant and equipment 
scaled by lagged assets (PPE) as well as CEO age, CEO gender, and CEO succession in our 
regression analyses. CEO succession indicates whether the CEO is appointed externally. 
<< Insert Appendix I about here >> 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics. The mean (median) of ETR is 0.308 (0.32), 
while the mean (median) of cash ETR is 0.254 (0.25). This is consistent with prior tax 
research reporting cash ETR is lower than ETR (Dyreng et al., 2008). The mean (median) of 
SVI varies from 0.24 (0.23) in the 25th percentile to 0.59 (0.59) in the 75th percentile, 
suggesting substantial variation in the Google search volume for CEOs. As our sample 
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consists of S&P 500 firms, the sample firms are large (mean logarithm of market value of 
9.44) and profitable (mean ROA of 13%). The mean firm spends 2.47% of its assets from the 
previous year on R&D, and 23.7% of its assets from the previous year are intangible assets. 
The mean firm has long-term debt that equals 19.95% of its assets in the previous year. On 
average, foreign income constitutes 4.19% of assets in the previous year. Finally, about 40% 
of sample firms have net operating loss carry-forwards at the beginning of the year. 
<< Insert Table 1 about here >> 
4.2 The determinants of CEO publicity 
We first explore the factors that contribute to the SVI of CEOs. Previous studies 
suggest that CEO personal attributes such as tenure, age, gender, and whether the CEO comes 
from outside the firm have an important impact on CEO status, so we include them as 
explanatory variables. We also include the number of online news articles provided by 
Google News that relate to the specific CEO. Media coverage does not necessarily guarantee 
attention unless investors attend to it, and the same news coverage could generate different 
levels of investor attention (Da et al., 2011; Ding and Hou, 2015).  
 Table 2 reports the results. Column 1 (2) reports the results with the mean of SVI 
(median of SVI) as the dependent variable. The significantly positive coefficients of CEO 
news, CEO age, and CEO gender suggest that CEOs with more online news coverage, old 
CEOs, and male CEOs receive more active attention from the public. The negative 
coefficient of CEO tenure implies that newly appointed CEOs attract more attention. The 
adjusted R2 of both regressions are below 11%, indicating that a significant proportion of the 
variation in CEO publicity cannot be explained by other CEO characteristics.  
<< Insert Table 2 about here >> 
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4.3 CEO publicity and tax avoidance 
Table 3 presents the test of hypotheses. Panel A shows the results based on the mean of 
SVIs. Models I and II (III and IV) use ETR (cash ETR) as the dependent variable. In Model I 
(III), we include SVI as the only measure of CEO publicity; in Model II (IV), we add CEO 
online news coverage as a second measure of CEO publicity. The negative and significant 
coefficient of SVI mean in Model I (-0.0363, t = −4.82) suggests that CEOs with higher 
public attention are associated with higher levels of tax avoidance activities, resulting in a 
lower effective tax rate. The coefficient of the SVI mean remains negative and significant 
after the inclusion of CEOs’ online news coverage in Model II (−0.0347, t = −4.64). CEO 
publicity has an incremental effect on firms’ tax avoidance activities. A one unit increase in 
SVI mean gives rise to a 3.6% decrease in effective tax rate. Given the median tax expense of 
$287 million among our sample firm, this translates into tax savings of $10.4 million. As the 
median firm has a market value of $11.78 billion, such tax savings are equal to 0.088% of the 
market value of the median sample firm.  
Among the control variables, the coefficients of leverage, ROA, and INTAN are 
significantly positive, suggesting that firms with higher leverage, higher profitability, and 
more intangible assets have a higher effective tax rate. The coefficients of foreign income 
(FI) and R&D are significantly negative, consistent with the prediction that firms with a 
higher percentage of foreign income and R&D expenses have more flexibility to reduce their 
overall tax burden. For example, they can use structured transaction to shift income to 
subsidiaries operating in low tax jurisdictions, develop tax efficient supply chains, and 
exploit intra-firm debt structure. Finally, the coefficient of size is negative and significant, 
consistent with the notion that large firms are able to contribute more resources to strategic 
tax planning to lower the effective tax rate. The adjusted R2 ranges from 16.43% to 28.71%, 
indicating that a considerable portion of variation in ETR and cash ETR has been explained. 
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Panel B shows regression results based on the median SVI of CEOs. The results of the 
negative coefficients of CEO publicity are consistent. Overall, we find supporting evidence 
for H1, that CEOs with higher publicity engage in tax avoidance activities to a more 
significant extent. 
<< Insert Table 3 about here >> 
4.4 The moderation effects of board independence 
Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) argue that managerial discretion exists when there is 
an absence of constraint or monitoring. When CEOs have more latitude, they have a stronger 
influence on organizational outcome. Armstrong et al. (2015) show that board independence 
is negatively related to tax avoidance for high levels of tax avoidance, which is also 
consistent with over-investment in tax avoidance in the absence of monitoring. We therefore 
study whether the effect of CEO publicity on tax avoidance activities differs between firms 
with different levels of internal monitoring, as reflected by board independence. We expect 
that more independent boards are effective in constraining the tax avoidance activities of 
CEOs with high publicity. We construct the dummy variable Low_Indep, which equals one if 
more than 67% (2/3) of the board members are insiders, and zero otherwise, and interact it 
with the mean of SVI (median of SVI). The results in Table 4 confirm our prediction. The 
coefficient of SVI mean remains significantly negative. The negative coefficient of the 
interaction term (-0.069, t = -3.42) indicates that the effect of CEO publicity on tax avoidance 
activities is more pronounced for firms with less independent boards. Inside directors are less 
effective in deterring CEOs’ tax avoidance activities. The coefficients of the control variables 
are broadly consistent with those in Table 3. The results based on the median of SVI are 
consistent.  
<< Insert Table 4 about here >> 
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4.5 Tax fee 
In this section, we explore how CEOs with higher publicity reduce the effective tax 
rate. Since CEOs are unlikely to be tax experts, they may rely on external auditors for advice 
on sophisticated tax planning techniques. Donohoe and Knechel (2014) find that firms with 
lower effective tax rate or cash ETR pay more for audit services than firms that are less 
aggressive in tax avoidance. We conjecture that CEOs with higher publicity pay higher tax 
fees to their auditors for tax planning services. We regress the natural logarithm of tax fee 
against CEO publicity, CEO- and firm-specific characteristics, and an indicator of Big 4 
auditor.  
The results are reported in Table 5. As expected, the coefficient of the SVI mean is 
significantly positive (0.273, t = 2.08). The results provide insights into the action of CEOs 
with high publicity to avoid tax for their firms. It is noteworthy that CEOs use tax planning 
services with non-audit fees (i.e. consultancy fees). CEO tenure is negatively associated with 
tax fee (−0.028, t = −4.95). Experienced CEOs have accumulated knowledge in tax planning 
after serving as the top executive for a number of years. Large firms, mature firms and firms 
with a higher percentage of foreign income pay more tax fees to auditors. The tax planning 
for these firms might be more complex. The results based on the median of SVI are 
consistent. The adjusted R2 is around 38%, showing that a significant percentage of the 
variation in tax fees is explained. 
<< Insert Table 5 about here >> 
5. Robustness checks  
5.1 Alternative specifications of tax avoidance 
 We perform a series of tests to verify the robustness of our results. Following Manzon 
and Plesko (2002), we calculate the total book-tax difference as the difference between pre-
tax income and the sum of current federal tax expense and current foreign tax expense scaled 
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by statutory marginal tax rate (BTD1). In addition, we follow Frank et al. (2009) to compute 
permanent book-tax difference (BTD2), which is the total book-tax difference less deferred 
tax expense scaled by statutory tax rate. Finally, we calculate the discretionary permanent 
book-tax difference (BTD3) as the residual of the regression model of the permanent book-
tax difference on non-discretionary items that cause such difference and other statutory 
adjustments unrelated to tax planning activities (Frank et al., 2009). These items include 
intangible assets, income reported under the equity method and attributable to minority 
interest, current state tax expense, changes in net operating loss carry-forwards (NOL), and 
one-year lagged permanent book-tax difference. The discretionary permanent book-tax 
difference is the residual from the regression.  
Table 6 reports the results. Panel A presents the results based on the SVI mean. 
Columns 1 and 2 report results with BTD1 as the dependent variable. The coefficients of SVI 
means are significantly positive in both columns, suggesting that CEOs that attract more 
public attention engage in a higher level of tax avoidance as reflected by greater total book-
tax difference. The coefficients of control variables show that firms with higher profitability, 
more foreign income, and more R&D expenditure have a larger book-tax difference. In 
Columns 3 and 4 (5 and 6), we use BTD2 (BTD3) as the tax avoidance measure, and get 
broadly consistent results. Panel B provides results when the SVI median is used to capture 
CEO publicity. The results remain consistent with the main findings. Finally, we follow 
Armstrong et al. (2012) to censor ETR and cash ETR to fall between zero and one, and 
employ a doubly censored Tobit model to mitigate the bias resulting from OLS regression. 
The untabulated results are consistent.  
 
<< Insert Table 6 about here >> 
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5.2 Endogeneity issue 
There are some alternative interpretations of the results. For example, corporate 
publicity may have confounding effects on corporate tax avoidance because CEOs’ publicity 
may be tangled with firms’ publicity (Graffin et al., 2012). It is possible that CEOs receive 
more attention because of news or announcements about their firms. If so, the results might 
be driven by firm publicity. We therefore collect the SVI of firm tickers by searching for the 
firm ticker data for CEOs from Google Trends (www.google.com/trends). We then calculate 
the FirmSVImean and FirmSVImedian in each year and incorporate them in our baseline 
models. The results are reported in Table 7. The significantly negative coefficient of CEO 
publicity helps to rule out this alternative interpretation.  
<< Insert Table 7 about here >> 
There is also a concern of reverse causality. An alternative interpretation is that the 
CEOs of firms that engage in tax avoidance behavior may attract more attention. We argue 
that this interpretation is not plausible, because the yearly CEO publicity is estimated from 
weekly SVIs, while tax avoidance is calculated based on the information from annual reports. 
In other words, most SVIs are recorded before the information around tax avoidance becomes 
available. Nevertheless, we still properly address the reverse causality issue in three ways. 
First, we use the dynamic panel system GMM estimator (Roodman, 2009) to address the 
concern that the current year CEO SVI is likely to be affected by past effective tax rate or 
book-tax differences. In our baseline results, we include two lags of tax avoidance measures 
in the model, and the results are reported in Table 8. The results are consistent with the main 
finding, suggesting that results are robust after controlling the dynamic reverse causality 
issue. Table 8 also reports the results of two specification tests, including the Hansen test of 
overidentification and the autocorrelation test. The Hansen test of overidentification indicates 
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that our instruments are valid. The AR(2) tests also suggest no evidence of second-order 
autocorrelation in the residuals.  
<< Insert Table 8 about here >> 
Second, we examine a sub-sample of firms that change CEOs in the sample period. 
We focus on 108 cases where the incoming CEO has a higher SVI (mean and median) than 
the departing CEO, and compare the ETR (cash ETR) in the year before the CEO departure 
and ETR (cash ETR) in the year after the CEO departure. The untabulated results show that 
the ETR (cash ETR) in the year preceding the CEO’s departure is significantly higher than 
the ETR (cash ETR) in the year following the CEO’s departure (difference = 0.0014 for ETR, 
0.0073 for cash ETR, both significant at the 5% level). The results based on CEO turnover 
further increase our confidence in the effects of CEO publicity on tax avoidance.  
Finally, we use the propensity-score matching (PSM) method to address the issue. We 
construct a dummy variable Top25%SVImean (or Top25%SVImedian), equal to one if the 
SVImean (or SVImedian) is in the top quartile, and zero otherwise, to represent CEOs who 
receive high attention from investors. Then, we follow Kubick and Lockhart (2017) to match 
each high-publicity CEO with a counterpart using the one-to-one nearest neighbor matching 
strategy. The results of Table 9 show that our baseline results are robust in the PSM sample. 
Although the results from robustness checks offer further support to the positive effects of 
CEO publicity on tax avoidance, a definite causal link cannot be established without an ideal 
instrumental variable based on exogenous shocks.  
<< Insert Table 9 about here >> 
6. Conclusion 
In this study, we use the search volume index (SVI) of CEOs’ full name plus the tickers 
of their companies provided by Google Trends to measure CEO publicity, and examine its 
relation to corporate tax avoidance. Unlike previous measures based on press coverage or 
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winning awards, our measure for CEO publicity captures the information demand for specific 
CEOs by retail investors.  
We find that CEOs with higher publicity are associated with lower effective tax rates. 
Such effect is more pronounced among firms with less effective monitoring, as reflected by 
lower board independence. Further analysis shows that CEOs with higher publicity are 
associated with higher tax fees. These CEOs tend to use more tax planning services from 
auditors to reduce the overall tax costs for their firms. Our results are robust to alternative 
model specifications and alternative measures of tax avoidance. The finding supports the 
hypothesis that CEOs with higher publicity are more likely to use tax avoidance to increase 
reported earnings and meet the performance expectations of the market. 
Our study has implications for tax authorities and investors. For example, tax 
authorities may pay special attention to firms with CEOs with good publicity. The attention 
puts pressure on them pressure to meet the expectations of the market, and they tend to 
engage in tax avoidance. By scrutinizing their tax practice, tax authorities might identify 
irregularities and recover tax that otherwise would not be collected. Our findings are of 
interest to investors and corporate board members. Extreme tax avoidance conducted by a 
CEO with high publicity may bring about regulatory enforcement or litigation risks. When 
extensive tax evasion behavior (e.g., a tax shelter) is detected, high publicity may exaggerate 
the reputation costs. We encourage future research to explore the impact of CEO publicity on 
other firm policies and outcomes.  
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Appendix I: Variable Definitions 
ETR1 = total tax expense (Compustat item #16)/pre-tax income (#170). 
ETR2 = cash tax paid (#317)/pre-tax income (#170) based on Chen et al. 
(2010). 
BTD1 = pre-tax income- (current federal tax expense + current foreign tax 
expense)/statutory marginal tax rate, based on Manzon and Plesko 
(2002). 
BTD2 = BTD1 – (total deferred tax expense (#50)/statutory marginal tax rate), 
based on Frank, Lynch and Rego (2009). 
BTD3 = Residuals from estimating equation (1) by two-digit SIC code and 
fiscal year, where all variables including the intercept are scaled by 
beginning 
of year total assets (#6): BTD2 = α0 + α1 INTANG + α2 UNCON + α3 
MI + α4 CSTE + α5 _NOL + α6 BTD2 lag + e (1) where INTANG = 
goodwill and other intangibles (#33); UNCON = income reported 
under the equity method (#55); MI = minority interest (#49); CSTE = 
current state income tax expense (#173); _NOL = change in net 
operating loss carry forward (#52); and BTD2 lag = the one-year 
lagged 
value of BTD2., based on Frank, Lynch and Rego (2009). 
Low_Indep = An indicator equal to 1 if the board contains less than 67% independent 
directors, and 0 otherwise. 
log(Taxfees) = The natural log of the tax fees (in thousands) paid by the firm. 
SVIMean = The mean of CEO SVI in each year. 
SVIMedian = The median of CEO SVI in each year. 
FirmSVIMean = The mean of firm SVI in each year. 
FirmSVIMedian = The median of firm SVI in each year. 
Top25%SVIMean = A dummy variable equal to 1 if the SVImean is in the top quartile, and 
0 otherwise. 
Top25%SVIMedian = A dummy variable equal to 1 if the SVImedian is in the top quartile, 
and 0 otherwise. 
LEV  = long-term debt/lagged total assets. 
ROA = operating income/lagged total assets. 
FI = foreign pre-tax income/lagged total assets; Missing values of foreign 
pre-tax income are set to zero. 
R&D = R&D expenditure/lagged total assets; Missing values of R&D expense 
are set to zero. 
INTAN = intangible assets/lagged total assets. 
PPE = property, plant and equipment/lagged total assets. 
NOL = Indicator variable that equals 1 if tax loss carry forward is positive at 
the beginning of year t, and 0 otherwise. 
DNOL = change in loss carry forward for firm i in year t/lagged total assets.  
EQIN = equity income in earnings/lagged total assets; Missing values of equity 
income are set to zero. 
SIZE = logarithm of market value of equity. 
MTB = market-to-book ratio measured as market value of equity divided by 
book value of equity. 
AGE = Age of CEO. 
Gender = Gender of CEO, equal to 1 if male and 0 otherwise. 
Succession = Indicator equal to 1 if the CEO is an outsider and 0 otherwise. 
CEONews = Natural log of the number of CEO news items that searching from 
Google in each year. 
CEOTenure = The length of tenure CEO in the position. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable 
 
N Mean Q1 Median Q3 
Std. 
Dev. 
ETR1 
 
2,841 0.3080 0.2600 0.3205 0.3668 0.0956 
ETR2 
 
2,841 0.2535 0.1505 0.2508 0.3336 0.1497 
BTD1 
 
2,841 0.0365 0.0083 0.0268 0.0539 0.0538 
BTD2 
 
2,841 0.0279 0.0044 0.0166 0.0399 0.0444 
BTD3 
 
2,841 0.0112 -0.0051 0.0041 0.0216 0.0368 
SVIMean 
 
2,841 0.4158 0.2408 0.4238 0.5915 0.2281 
SVIMedian 
 
2,841 0.4072 0.2300 0.4150 0.5900 0.2352 
FirmSVIMean  2,841 0.5677 0.4358 0.5942 0.7250 0.2011 
FirmSVIMedian  2,841 0.5609 0.4250 0.5850 0.7200 0.2047 
CEONews 
 
2,841 1.6234 0.0000 1.3863 2.3979 1.5543 
CEOTenure 
 
2,841 7.0619 2.9800 5.4000 9.0027 6.3051 
LEV  
 
2,841 0.1995 0.0821 0.1748 0.2859 0.1682 
ROA 
 
2,841 0.1300 0.0591 0.1100 0.1798 0.1062 
FI 
 
2,841 0.0419 0.0000 0.0171 0.0665 0.0590 
R&D 
 
2,841 0.0247 0.0000 0.0000 0.0289 0.0451 
INTAN 
 
2,841 0.2370 0.0408 0.1681 0.3632 0.2758 
PPE 
 
2,841 0.2918 0.0914 0.1930 0.4369 0.2843 
NOL 
 
2,841 0.3988 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4897 
DNOL 
 
2,841 0.0045 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1002 
EQIN 
 
2,841 0.0017 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0065 
SIZE 
 
2,841 9.4444 8.4112 9.3298 10.3164 1.3837 
MTB   2,841 3.4955 1.7948 2.7656 4.2836 29.1371 
Age  2,841 55.9247 52.0000 56.0000 60.0000 6.4856 
Gender  2,841 0.9747 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.1572 
Succession  2,841 0.0630 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2430 
log(Taxfees)  2,508 6.0526 4.9359 6.2624 7.2481 1.7258 
Low_Indep  2,239 0.1550 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3620 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the paper.  
The number of observations for the full sample is 2,841.  
 
 
 24 
Table 2 
Regressing SVI Measures on traditional CEO Reputation Measures 
Dep. Variable 
 
SVIMean   SVIMedian 
Intercept 
 
– 32.562*** 
 
– 33.498*** 
  
(– 6.95) 
 
(– 6.90) 
CEONews 
 
0.012*** 
 
0.012*** 
  
(4.51) 
 
(4.37) 
CEOTenure 
 
– 0.005*** 
 
– 0.005*** 
  
(– 6.22) 
 
(– 5.72) 
Age 
 
0.002*** 
 
0.002*** 
  
(3.15) 
 
(3.02) 
Gender 
 
0.082*** 
 
0.080*** 
  
(3.04) 
 
(2.86) 
Succession 
 
– 0.024 
 
– 0.029 
  
(– 1.35) 
 
(– 1.59) 
    Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Yes 
Obs. 
 
          2841 
 
                2841 
Adj. R2   10.66%   10.03% 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
levels, respectively, under two-tailed tests. 
t-statistics, in parentheses, are based on standard errors adjusted for firm-
level clustering.  
This table summarizes the results of regressing SVIMean and SVIMedian 
on other measures related with CEO reputation, i.e. CEONews, 
CEOTenure, Age, Gender & Succession. 
Age = Age of CEO; 
Gender = Gender of CEO, equal to 1 if male and 0 
otherwise; 
Succession = Indicator equal to 1 if the CEO is an outsider 
and 0 otherwise. 
The other variables are defined as in Appendix I. 
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Table 3 
CEO SVI and Tax avoidance activities: Results on the Effective Tax Rate 
Panel A: SVI Mean 
Dep. Variable 
 
                 ETR1                          ETR2 
Intercept 
 
0.3326*** 0.3310*** 0.2787*** 0.2778*** 
  
(9.27) (9.24) (4.69) (4.67) 
SVIMean 
 
-0.0363*** -0.0347*** -0.0472*** -0.0464*** 
  
(-4.82) (-4.64) (-3.85) (-3.76) 
CEONews 
 
 -0.0025**  -0.0013 
  
 (-2.23)  (-0.75) 
LEV 
 
0.0381** 0.0375** -0.0079 -0.0082 
  
(2.30) (2.26) (-0.36) (-0.37) 
ROA 
 
0.1540*** 0.1536*** 0.0319 0.0317 
  
(6.33) (6.34) (0.88) (0.87) 
FI 
 
-0.4349*** -0.4322*** -0.1744** -0.1730** 
  
(-9.08) (-9.09) (-2.25) (-2.23) 
R&D  -0.2677*** -0.2506*** -0.5761*** -0.5670*** 
  (-4.29) (-3.98) (-7.32) (-7.09) 
INTAN 
 
0.0190* 0.0195** 0.0668*** 0.0671*** 
  
(1.90) (1.96) (3.55) (3.57) 
PPE 
 
-0.0139 -0.0133 -0.1010*** -0.1006*** 
  
(-0.71) (-0.69) (-2.86) (-2.86) 
NOL 
 
-0.0037 -0.0039 -0.0047 -0.0048 
  
(-1.07) (-1.14) (-0.79) (-0.82) 
DNOL 
 
-0.0297 -0.0301 -0.0210 -0.0212 
  
(-1.31) (-1.34) (-0.89) (-0.90) 
EQIN 
 
0.1528 0.1869 -0.5087 -0.4906 
  
(0.39) (0.48) (-1.27) (-1.22) 
SIZE 
 
-0.0050*** -0.0042** 0.0022 0.0026 
  
(-2.93) (-2.35) (0.83) (0.96) 
MTB 
 
0.0001* 0.0001* 0.0001 0.0001 
  
(1.79) (1.74) (1.23) (1.22) 
Age  0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 
  (1.61) (1.64) (1.32) (1.33) 
Gender  0.0077 0.0071 0.0196 0.0193 
  (0.94) (0.87) (1.25) (1.23) 
Succession  -0.0085 -0.0083 -0.0082 -0.0080 
  (-1.19) (-1.16) (-0.63) (-0.62) 
Industry Fixed Effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 
 
2841 2841 2841 2841 
Adj. R2   28.62% 28.74% 16.47% 16.45% 
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Panel B: SVI Median 
Dep. Variable 
 
ETR1 ETR2 
Intercept 
 
0.3326*** 0.3310*** 0.2786*** 0.2777*** 
  
(9.92) (9.23) (4.69) (4.66) 
SVIMedian 
 
-0.0341*** -0.0327*** -0.0448*** -0.0440*** 
  
(-4.72) (-4.53) (-3.77) (-3.69) 
CEONews 
 
 -0.0026**  -0.0014 
    (-2.26)  (-0.77) 
LEV 
 
0.0379** 0.0373** -0.0081 -0.0085 
  
(2.28) (2.25) (-0.37) (-0.38) 
ROA 
 
0.1540*** 0.1535*** 0.0318 0.0316 
  
(6.33) (6.34) (0.88) (0.87) 
FI 
 
-0.4354*** -0.4327*** -0.1750** -0.1735** 
  
(-9.08) (-9.09) (-2.25) (-2.23) 
R&D -0.2668*** -0.2495*** -0.5752*** -0.5659*** 
  (-4.27) (-3.96) (-7.31) (-7.07) 
INTAN 
 
0.0190* 0.0195** 0.0668*** 0.0671*** 
  
(1.90) (1.96) (3.55) (3.57) 
PPE 
 
-0.0139 -0.0132 -0.1009*** -0.1006*** 
  
(-0.71) (-0.68) (-2.86) (-2.86) 
NOL 
 
-0.0037 -0.0039 -0.0047 -0.0048 
  
(-1.08) (-1.15) (-0.80) (-0.82) 
DNOL 
 
-0.0296 -0.0300 -0.0209 -0.0211 
  
(-1.31) (-1.34) (-0.89) (-0.90) 
EQIN 
 
0.1526 0.1871 -0.5088 -0.4901 
  
(0.39) (0.48) (-1.27) (-1.22) 
SIZE 
 
-0.0050*** -0.0042** 0.0022 0.0026 
  
(-2.95) (-2.36) (0.81) (0.95) 
MTB 
 
0.0001* 0.0001* 0.0001 0.0001 
  
(1.80) (1.75) (1.23) (1.23) 
Age 0.0004 0.0004* 0.0005 0.0006 
  (1.62) (1.65) (1.32) (1.33) 
Gender  0.0075 0.0069 0.0194 0.0190 
  (0.91) (0.85) (1.23) (1.21) 
Succession  -0.0085 -0.0083 -0.0083 -0.0081 
  
(-1.20) (-1.17) (-0.63) (-0.62) 
Industry Fixed Effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 
 
2841 2841 2841 2841 
Adj. R2  28.59% 28.71% 16.45% 16.43% 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, 
under two-tailed tests. 
t-statistics, in parentheses, are based on robust standard errors.  
This table summarizes the results of Equation (1), the regression of CEO SVI on tax 
aggressiveness measure, i.e. effective tax rates (ETR1 & ETR2). The second column also 
includes CEONews. 
The variables are defined as in Appendix I. 
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Table 4 
CEO SVI and Tax avoidance activities: Effects of Board Independence 
Dep. Variable    ETR1 ETR2 
Intercept 
 
0.3326*** 0.3330*** 0.3153*** 0.3157*** 
  
(8.84) (8.82) (4.57) (4.57) 
SVIMean 
 
-0.0302*** 
 
-0.0587***  
  
(-3.36) 
 
(-3.81)  
SVIMedian 
 
 
-0.0283***  -0.0589*** 
  
 
(-3.25)  (-3.95) 
Low_Indep 
 
0.0337*** 0.0289*** -0.0028 -0.0085 
  
(3.54) (3.33) (-0.14) (-0.46) 
SVIMean*Low_Indep -0.0689*** 
 
0.0142  
  
(-3.42) 
 
(0.36)  
SVIMedian*Low_Indep 
 
-0.0588***  0.0284 
    
 
(-3.15)  (0.75) 
CEONews 
 
-0.0019 -0.0020 0.0007 0.0007 
  
(-1.50) (-1.54) (0.34) (0.31) 
CEOTenure 
 
0.0004 0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 
  
(1.43) (1.50) (-0.78) (-0.76) 
LEV 
 
0.0443*** 0.0446*** 0.0364 0.0374 
  
(3.27) (3.29) (1.46) (1.50) 
ROA 
 
0.1811*** 0.1809*** 0.0460 0.0455 
  
(6.13) (6.11) (0.93) (0.92) 
FI 
 
-0.3650*** -0.3651*** -0.1122 -0.1126 
  
(-7.06) (-7.02) (-1.18) (-1.18) 
R&D 
 
-0.2887*** -0.2846*** -0.3700*** -0.3654*** 
  
(-3.56) (-3.51) (-3.36) (-3.32) 
INTAN 
 
0.0148* 0.0146* 0.0494** 0.0491** 
  
(1.82) (1.79) (2.58) (2.56) 
PPE 
 
-0.0229 -0.0226 -0.1154*** -0.1152*** 
  
(-1.24) (-1.21) (-3.01) (-2.99) 
NOL 
 
-0.0047 -0.0046 -0.0064 -0.0064 
  
(-1.32) (-1.29) (-0.96) (-0.96) 
DNOL 
 
-0.0114 -0.0114 0.0199 0.0190 
  
(-0.19) (-0.19) (0.30) (0.28) 
EQIN 
 
0.1888 0.1873 -0.2474 -0.2533 
  
(0.44) (0.43) (-0.52) (-0.53) 
SIZE 
 
-0.0039** -0.0039* -0.0012 -0.0012 
  
(-1.96) (-1.94) (-0.38) (-0.38) 
MTB 
 
0.0001* 0.0001* 0.0001* 0.0001* 
  
(1.89) (1.90) (1.65) (1.67) 
Age 0.0002 0.0001 0.0004 0.0004 
  (0.50) (0.46) (0.66) (0.66) 
Gender  0.0049 0.0047 0.0180 0.0180 
  (0.60) (0.57) (1.06) (1.07) 
Succession  -0.0087 -0.0086 -0.0003 -0.0003 
  (-1.19) (-1.17) (-0.02) (-0.02) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 
 
2239 2239 2239 2239 
Adj. R2  28.98% 28.83% 12.97% 12.99% 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, under two-tailed 
tests. 
t-statistics, in parentheses, are based on robust standard errors.  
This table summarizes the results of the regression of tax aggressiveness measures (i.e. effective tax rates 
(ETR1) on SVI measures with the interaction of the indicator for board independence (Low_Indep). 
Low_Indep is an indicator equal to 1 if the board contains less than 67% independent directors, and 0 
otherwise. The other variables are defined as in Appendix I. 
 28 
 
Table 5 
     CEO SVI and Tax Fees 
Dep. Variable = log(Taxfees) 
 
    
Intercept 
 
181.479***  181.967*** 
  
(6.07)  (6.12) 
SVIMean 
 
0.273** 
  
  
(2.08) 
  SVIMedian 
   
0.308** 
    
(2.44) 
CEONews 
 
0.003  0.003 
  
(0.14)  (0.13) 
CEOTenure 
 
– 0.028***  – 0.028*** 
  
(– 4.95)  (– 4.95) 
Age 
 
0.014*** 
 
0.014*** 
  
(2.68) 
 
(2.67) 
SIZE 
 
 0.615*** 
 
 0.614*** 
  
(22.61) 
 
(22.20) 
LEV 
 
– 0.274 
 
– 0.282 
  
(– 1.40) 
 
(– 1.44) 
ROA 
 
– 0.426 
 
– 0.420 
  
(– 0.88) 
 
(– 0.86) 
FI 
 
2.744*** 
 
2.748*** 
  
(3.74) 
 
(3.75) 
MTB 
 
– 0.001 
 
– 0.001 
  
(0.40) 
 
(0.40) 
BIG4 
 
0.060 
 
0.061 
  
(0.87) 
 
(0.89) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Yes 
Year Fixed Effects 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Obs. 
 
      2538 
 
      2538 
Adj. R2   38.28%   38.32% 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
levels, respectively, under two-tailed tests. 
t-statistics, in parentheses, are based on robust standard errors.  
This table summarizes the results of regressing tax fees on CEO SVI 
measures. 
log(Taxfees) is the natural log of the tax fees (in thousands) paid by the 
firm. 
BIG4 is an indicator equal to 1 if the firm is audited by a Big 4 auditor, and 
0 otherwise.  
The other variables are defined as in Appendix I. 
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Table 6 
CEO SVI and Tax avoidance activities: Results on the Book-Tax Difference 
Panel A: SVI Mean 
  Dep. Variable 
 
      BTD1               BTD2          BTD3 
Intercept 
 
-0.0285 -0.0275 -0.0009 0.0005 -0.0045 -0.0033 
  
(-1.10) (-1.06) (-0.04) (0.03) (-0.15) (-0.11) 
SVIMean 
 
0.0165*** 0.0156*** 0.0155*** 0.0142*** 0.0113* 0.0102 
  
(4.08) (3.91) (5.19) (4.90) (1.81) (1.63) 
CEONews 
 
 0.0016**  0.0021***  0.0018** 
     (2.49)  (4.22)  (2.07) 
Control  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 
 
2841 2841 2841 2841 2841 2841 
Adj. R2   29.44% 29.58% 43.51% 43.94% 34.71% 34.76% 
  
Panel B: SVI Median 
  Dep. Variable 
 
BTD1   BTD2 BTD3 
Intercept 
 
-0.0285 -0.0274 -0.0009 0.0005 -0.0044 -0.0033 
  
(-1.10) (-1.05) (-0.04) (0.03) (-0.15) (-0.11) 
SVIMedian 
 
0.0163*** 0.0154*** 0.0146*** 0.0134*** 0.0112* 0.0102* 
  
(4.13) (3.97) (5.03) (4.74) (1.88) (1.71) 
CEONews 
 
 0.0016**  0.0022***  0.0018** 
    (2.50)  (4.24)  (2.08) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 
 
2841 2841 2841 2841 2841 2841 
Adj. R2  29.45% 29.59% 43.48% 43.92% 34.71% 34.77% 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, under two-tailed 
tests. 
t-statistics, in parentheses, are based on standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering.  
This table summarizes the results of Equation (1), the regression of CEO SVI on tax aggressiveness measure, i.e. 
book-tax difference (BTD1, BTD2 & ETR2). The second column also includes CEONews. 
The variables are defined as in Appendix I. 
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Table 7 
CEO SVI and Tax avoidance activities: Controlling Firm SVI 
Dep. Variable    ETR1 ETR2 
Intercept 
 
0.3339*** 0.3342*** 0.2821*** 0.2833*** 
  
(9.27) (9.29) (4.71) (4.74) 
SVIMean 
 
-0.0290***  -0.0379**  
  
(-2.86)  (-2.27)  
SVIMedian 
 
 -0.0264***  -0.0334** 
  
 (-2.74)  (-2.07) 
FirmSVIMean 
 
-0.0099  -0.0147  
  
(-0.87)  (-0.78)  
FirmSVIMedian  -0.0112  -0.0190 
  
 (-1.02)  (-1.02) 
CEONews 
 
-0.0026** -0.0026** -0.0014 -0.0015 
  
(-2.27) (-2.30) (-0.78) (-0.81) 
LEV 
 
0.0371** 0.0369** -0.0089 -0.0092 
  
(2.24) (2.22) (-0.40) (-0.41) 
ROA 
 
0.1544*** 0.1546*** 0.0329 0.0333 
  
(6.40) (6.41) (0.91) (0.92) 
FI 
 
-0.4342*** -0.4348*** -0.1758** -0.1772** 
  
(-9.11) (-9.12) (-2.25) (-2.27) 
R&D 
 
-0.2481*** -0.2467*** -0.5633*** -0.5610*** 
  
(-3.93) (-3.91) (-7.03) (-7.00) 
INTAN 
 
0.0196** 0.0196** 0.0671*** 0.0672*** 
  
(1.97) (1.97) (3.58) (3.58) 
PPE 
 
-0.0134 -0.0134 -0.1008*** -0.1009*** 
  
(-0.69) (-0.69) (-2.85) (-2.85) 
NOL 
 
-0.0041 -0.0042 -0.0051 -0.0052 
  
(-1.20) (-1.22) (-0.87) (-0.89) 
DNOL 
 
-0.0300 -0.0299 -0.0212 -0.0210 
  
(-1.35) (-1.35) (-0.91) (-0.92) 
EQIN 
 
0.1889 0.1899 -0.4876 -0.4854 
  
(0.48) (0.48) (-1.21) (-1.20) 
SIZE 
 
-0.0043** -0.0043** 0.0025 0.0025 
  
(-2.38) (-2.39) (0.93) (0.93) 
MTB 
 
0.0001* 0.0001* 0.0001 0.0001 
  
(1.70) (1.71) (1.22) (1.22) 
Age 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 
  (1.63) (1.63) (1.32) (1.32) 
Gender  0.0071 0.0069 0.0192 0.0190 
  (0.87) (0.85) (1.23) (1.21) 
Succession  -0.0083 -0.0084 -0.0081 -0.0082 
  (-1.17) (-1.17) (-0.62) (-0.63) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 
 
2239 2239 2239 2239 
Adj. R2  28.73% 28.71% 16.44% 16.44% 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, under two-tailed 
tests. 
t-statistics, in parentheses, are based on robust standard errors.  
This table summarizes the results of the regression of tax aggressiveness measures (i.e. effective tax rates 
(ETR1) on SVI measures with interaction of indicator for board independence (Low_Indep). 
Low_Indep is an indicator equal to 1 if the board contains less than 67% independent directors, and 0 
otherwise. The other variables are defined as in Appendix I. 
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Table 8 
CEO SVI and Tax avoidance activities: Results on Dynamic Panel System GMM 
Panel A: SVI Mean   
Dep. Variable 
 
ETR1 ETR2 BTD1 BTD2 BTD3 
SVIMean 
 
-0.0763** -0.0474 0.0421** 0.0341*** 0.0339*** 
  
(-2.48) (-1.13) (2.42) (3.04) (3.06) 
CEONews 
 
-0.0052 0.0065 0.0037* 0.0041*** 0.0032** 
  
(-1.61) (1.03) (1.90) (2.71) (2.16) 
LEV 
 
-0.0435 0.0064 -0.0035 0.0041 0.0020 
  
(-1.60) (0.14) (-0.20) (0.34) (0.18) 
ROA 
 
0.1149** -0.1677* 0.1219*** 0.1255*** 0.0336 
  
(1.98) (-1.65) (2.75) (4.31) (1.14) 
FI 
 
-0.4835*** 0.0043 0.1040 0.1547*** 0.1995*** 
  
(-4.68) (0.02) (1.03) (2.86) (3.42) 
R&D 
 
-0.4067** -0.5252** 0.0277 0.0919 0.1216* 
  
(-2.54) (-2.33) (0.31) (1.46) (1.84) 
INTAN 
 
0.0149 0.0726*** -0.0069 0.0024 -0.0006 
  
(0.80) (2.78) (-0.80) (0.38) (-0.10) 
PPE 
 
0.0714*** -0.0538 -0.0177 -0.0429*** -0.0373*** 
  
(3.58) (-1.40) (-0.86) (-3.67) (-2.96) 
NOL 
 
-0.0018 0.0206 0.0014 -0.0011 0.0035 
  
(-0.17) (1.20) (0.23) (-0.27) (0.92) 
DNOL 
 
-0.0233 0.0434 -0.0209 -0.0257 -0.0254 
  
(-0.33) (0.42) (-0.43) (-0.58) (-0.54) 
EQIN 
 
1.8060** -0.9665 -1.1483* -1.0936*** -1.6406*** 
  
(2.13) (-0.53) (-1.92) (-2.80) (-3.98) 
SIZE 
 
-0.0067 -0.0123 -0.0012 -0.0007 0.0011 
  
(-0.99) (-1.20) (-0.30) (-0.28) (0.43) 
MTB 
 
0.0000 0.0001* -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
  
(0.48) (1.80) (-0.60) (-0.44) (-0.90) 
Age 0.0006 -0.0006 0.0006 -0.0001 0.0002 
  (0.82) (-0.50) (1.06) (-0.26) (0.47) 
Gender  0.0024 0.0185 0.0085 0.0074 0.0089 
  (0.11) (0.69) (1.06) (1.08) (1.40) 
Succession  0.0859** 0.0971 -0.0235 -0.0061 -0.0213 
  (2.16) (1.62) (-0.87) (-0.42) (-1.32) 
ETR1 (lag 1) 
 
-0.0544     
  
(-0.79)     
ETR1 (lag 2) 
 
0.0227     
  
(0.59)     
ETR2 (lag 1) 
 
 0.1925***    
  
 (3.74)    
ETR2 (lag 2) 
 
 0.0445    
  
 (0.84)    
BTD1 (lag 1) 
 
  0.1536***   
  
  (3.55)   
BTD1 (lag 2) 
 
  -0.0196   
  
  (-0.66)   
BTD2 (lag 1) 
 
   0.1572***  
  
   (3.08)  
BTD2 (lag 2) 
 
   0.0779**  
  
   (2.44)  
BTD3 (lag 1) 
 
    -0.1362*** 
  
    (-2.65) 
BTD3 (lag 2) 
 
    0.0972** 
  
    (2.25) 
AR(1) test (p value) 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test (p value) 
 
0.408 0.802 0.481 0.556 0.147 
Hansen test (p value) 
 
0.458 0.252 0.229 0.231 0.381 
Obs. 
 
1716 1716 1716 1716 1716 
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Panel B: SVI Median 
Dep. Variable 
 
ETR1 ETR2 BTD1 BTD2 BTD3 
SVIMedian 
 
-0.0714** -0.0484 0.0422** 0.0337*** 0.0338*** 
  
(-2.45) (-1.18) (2.44) (3.09) (3.05) 
CEONews 
 
-0.0050 0.0063 0.0038* 0.0042*** 0.0032** 
  
(-1.54) (0.98) (1.93) (2.82) (2.20) 
LEV 
 
-0.0411 0.0118 -0.0051 0.0039 0.0022 
  
(-1.51) (0.27) (-0.30) (0.32) (0.19) 
ROA 
 
0.1186** -0.1645 0.1203*** 0.1252*** 0.0330 
  
(2.06) (-1.62) (2.76) (4.31) (1.12) 
FI 
 
-0.4930*** 0.0046 0.1082 0.1532*** 0.1978*** 
  
(-4.74) (0.02) (1.08) (2.85) (3.44) 
R&D 
 
-0.3891** -0.5165** 0.0171 0.0887 0.1214* 
  
(-2.39) (-2.28) (0.19) (1.39) (1.83) 
INTAN 
 
0.0162 0.0740*** -0.0075 0.0020 -0.0012 
  
(0.89) (2.81) (-0.87) (0.31) (-0.18) 
PPE 
 
0.0698*** -0.0546 -0.0182 -0.0423*** -0.0367*** 
  
(3.37) (-1.43) (-0.87) (-3.59) (-2.83) 
NOL 
 
-0.0014 0.0202 0.0016 -0.0013 0.0035 
  
(-0.13) (1.19) (0.26) (-0.31) (0.90) 
DNOL 
 
-0.0217 0.0460 -0.0209 -0.0263 -0.0244 
  
(-0.30) (0.44) (-0.44) (-0.60) (-0.53) 
EQIN 
 
1.8669** -0.8095 -1.2728** -1.1424*** -1.6680*** 
  
(2.24) (-0.47) (-2.08) (-3.00) (-4.17) 
SIZE 
 
-0.0055 -0.0113 -0.0020 -0.0010 0.0008 
  
(-0.78) (-1.11) (-0.48) (-0.39) (0.30) 
MTB 
 
0.0000 0.0001* -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
  
(0.47) (1.81) (-0.60) (-0.45) (-0.92) 
Age 0.0008 -0.0006 0.0005 -0.0001 0.0001 
  (1.04) (-0.53) (0.89) (-0.37) (0.37) 
Gender  0.0029 0.0182 0.0077 0.0071 0.0086 
  (0.13) (0.67) (0.96) (1.04) (1.34) 
Succession  0.0798* 0.1024* -0.0219 -0.0050 -0.0198 
  (1.93) (1.67) (-0.78) (-0.34) (-1.18) 
ETR1 (lag 1) 
 
-0.0489     
  
(-0.72)     
ETR1 (lag 2) 
 
0.0298     
  
(0.78)     
ETR2 (lag 1) 
 
 0.1940***    
  
 (3.76)    
ETR2 (lag 2) 
 
 0.0386    
  
 (0.74)    
BTD1 (lag 1) 
 
  0.1517***  
  
  (3.49)   
BTD1 (lag 2) 
 
  -0.0220   
  
  (-0.73)   
BTD2 (lag 1) 
 
   0.1556*** 
  
   (3.04)  
BTD2 (lag 2) 
 
   0.0781** 
  
   (2.46)  
BTD3 (lag 1) 
 
    -0.1366*** 
  
    (-2.69) 
BTD3 (lag 2) 
 
    0.0981** 
  
    (2.27) 
AR(1) test (p value) 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) test (p value) 
 
0.406 0.744 0.478 0.511 0.131 
Hansen test (p value) 
 
0.570 0.278 0.196 0.242 0.373 
Obs. 
 
1716 1716 1716 1716 1716 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, under two-tailed tests. 
z-statistics, in parentheses, are based on robust standard errors. 
This table reports two-step dynamic panel system GMM estimations of tax avoidance measures on CEO SVI measures. All models include year 
dummy variables. All independent variables are treated as endogenous except year dummy variables. Endogenous variables are instrumented by 
three of their past values. The null hypothesis for the Hansen test of overidentification is that all instruments are exogenous. AR(1) and AR(2) 
are test statistics for the null hypothesis that there is no serial correlation of orders 1 and 2 in the first-difference residuals. 
The variables are defined as in Appendix I. 
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Table 9 
CEO SVI and Tax avoidance activities: Results on Propensity-score Matched Sample 
Panel A: Propensity Score Model  
  
Dep. Variable  Top25%SVIMean Top25%SVIMedian 
Intercept  -1.7760*** -1.6238*** 
 
 (-3.04) (-2.77) 
CEONews  0.0435** 0.0314* 
 
 (2.33) (1.66) 
LEV  0.8301*** 0.8240*** 
 
 (3.99) (3.92) 
ROA  -0.1394 -0.1329 
 
 (-0.37) (-0.35) 
FI  -0.7586 -0.9346 
 
 (-1.10) (-1.33) 
R&D  -4.8212*** -4.2794*** 
 
 (-4.84) (-4.27) 
INTAN  0.0525 0.0997 
 
 (0.45) (0.86) 
PPE  -0.1709 -0.1808 
 
 (-0.91) (-0.94) 
NOL  -0.0964 -0.0837 
 
 (-1.54) (-1.33) 
DNOL  -0.5952 -0.3910 
 
 (-1.12) (-0.76) 
EQIN  0.2664 -2.8939 
 
 (0.06) (-0.58) 
SIZE  0.0423 0.0469* 
 
 (1.50) (1.65) 
MTB  0.0019 0.0013 
 
 (1.05) (0.83) 
Age  0.0045 0.0042 
 
 (1.01) (0.93) 
Gender  0.2464 0.1806 
 
 (1.38) (1.01) 
Succession  0.0009 -0.0176 
 
 (0.01) (-0.15) 
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2  7.01% 7.26% 
Obs.  2729 2742 
 
Panel B Differences-in-Mean tests in PSM Sample  
 
 
Top25%SVIMean Non-Top25%SVIMean Differences-in-Mean 
ETR1 0.2994 0.3122 -0.0128** 
ETR2 0.2433 0.273 -0.0297*** 
Obs 709 709 
 
    
 
Top25%SVIMedian Non-Top25%SVIMedian Difference-in-Mean 
ETR1 0.2980 0.3126 -0.0145*** 
ETR2 0.2423 0.2664  -0.02411*** 
Obs 674 674 
 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, under two-tailed tests. 
z-statistics, in parentheses, appear in Panel A. 
Panel A reports the probit model regression analysis, which is used to obtain the propensity-score. Panel B reports the 
differences-in-mean test between the top quartile of the CEO SVI and matched non-top quartile in the propensity-score 
matched sample. All the variables are reported in Appendix I. 
